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In this paper, we aim to shed light on the geographies that led both to the selection of 
Lodge Hill for the construction of a large-scale housing development and to the 
subsequent attempt to use biodiversity offsetting to compensate for its environmental 
impacts. We draw on extensive fieldwork from 2012 to 2016, and diverge from previous 
studies on offsetting by focusing less on issues related to metrics and governance and 
shifting our analytic attention to the economic and urban geographies surrounding the 
Lodge Hill case. We argue that this approach can offer not only an empirically grounded 
account of why offsetting is being selected to address the impacts of specific urban 
development projects, but also an in-depth understanding of the factors that determine 
offsetting’s actual implementation on the ground. Viewing the Lodge Hill case through 
the frame of urbanisation allows us to better grasp the how, why and when particular 
alliances of actors contest and/or support the implementation of biodiversity offsetting. 
Our analytical lens also helps exposing the fragility of neoliberal natures and the roles 
inter-capitalist competition and species biology and ecology can play on the success or 




[The defence secretary] was questioned as to why the Ministry of Defence had failed to 
release enough land. One factor, apparently, was the presence of wild birds on some sites: 
prompting the chancellor to ask environment secretary Owen Paterson what more he 
could do to remove the feathered obstacles to economic revival. 
Pickard and Parker, 20131 (added emphasis) 
 
In March 2013, Lodge Hill, a decommissioned military camp in the rural Hoo Peninsula 
in South East England, attracted unprecedented media attention1 across the country. The 
ex-camp was going to be turned to a major housing development, but wildlife protection 
issues arose during the planning process, making Lodge Hill one of the most 
controversial urban development projects of the last decade in England. The cynical 
characterisation of the area’s nightingales as ‘feathered obstacles to economic revival’ by 
the then Chancellor of the Exchequer1 did not fit quite well with the pledge of the 
previous Coalition government (2010-2015) that it would be the ‘greenest government 
ever’2. Even though the story of the housing development in Lodge Hill goes back to 
1995 and the broader regeneration plans for East London, North Kent and South Essex, it 
was not until 2007 that the project started getting off the ground. The submission of a 
planning application for the construction of 5,000 new houses led to enquiries regarding 
the environmental conditions in the area. Lodge Hill proved to be a significant area for 
wildlife, inter alia, because of the presence of c. 1.3% of the national UK nightingale 
(Luscinia megarhynchos) population.  
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The national significance of the nightingale population in Lodge Hill initiated a 
conflict between urban development and environmental protection. The environmental 
controversy over the new housing development eventually centred on the use of 
biodiversity offsetting for providing the necessary compensation for the loss of 
nightingale habitat. Biodiversity offsetting had been introduced in the UK in 2013 (Defra, 
2013) and was seen by the government as a policy that had the potential to reconcile 
nature conservation and economic development (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017, 
2019; Hannis and Sullivan, 2012; Lockhart, 2015).  
In this paper, we aim to shed light on the geographies that led both to the selection 
of Lodge Hill for the construction of a large-scale housing development and to the 
subsequent attempt to use biodiversity offsetting to compensate for its environmental 
impacts. Our goal is twofold. Firstly, to explore how the history of nature and its 
conservation in Lodge Hill, especially during the last three decades, has been sutured 
both with the development of the Thames Gateway regeneration project (Allmendinger 
and Haughton, 2009; Raco, 2005), and with key changes in the dominant frames of non-
human nature in UK conservation. Secondly, to show that experimentation with 
biodiversity offsetting in England reveals that the implementation of neoliberal 
conservation on the ground is a highly contested process with uncertain outcomes. 
Thirdly, we aim to decentre political ecologies away from conservation-as-a-new-
frontier–of-accumulation, towards an understanding of neoliberal conservation as part of 
the wider political project of the neoliberalisation of nature that considers the dialectics 
between “green” and “un-green” grabbing (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2015). Through 
our analysis we aim to offer not only an empirically grounded account of why offsetting 
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is being selected as the appropriate policy to address the biodiversity impacts of specific 
urban development projects, but also an in-depth understanding of the factors that 
influence and ultimately determine its success or failure. Our overall goal is to, thus, 
understand and substantiate the where, when, and by whom neoliberal conservation 
policies are being promoted, contested and succeed (or fail) to fulfil their promises.  
 
Theoretical considerations and empirical investigation 
In principle, offsetting seeks to compensate losses to biodiversity in one place by 
securing equivalent biodiversity gains elsewhere and promises to achieve a No Net Loss 
or even a Net Gain of biodiversity (Defra, 2013). Often, but not always, this process is 
mediated by a market-based mechanism, whereby credits (e.g. habitat or conservation 
credits), which are calculated using a series of metrics, are exchanged between 
contracting parties (e.g. a developer and a land owner whose land acts as a habitat or 
conservation bank). Biodiversity offsetting involves the deregulation, market-friendly 
reregulation, and ‘thickening’ (Rea, 2018) of environment and planning legislation to 
foster economic development and growth, the extension and consolidation of the 
monetary valuation of previously unvalued natures, and an increased involvement of the 
private sector in sustaining social reproduction (Apostolopoulou et al., 2018).  
So far, critical scholars have been primarily concentrated on the role of offset 
metrics and valuation techniques in the creation of new value(s) from nature (see e.g. 
Bracking et al., 2014; Dauguet, 2015; Robertson, 2000, 2012; Sullivan, 2013) and to a 
lesser extent on the social impacts of offsetting (see e.g. Apostolopoulou, in press; 
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Bidaud et al., 2017; Seagle, 2012). In the UK, research has primarily focused on offset 
metrics (see e.g. Carver and Sullivan, 2017), value struggles (see e.g. Sullivan and 
Hannis, 2015) and issues of governance and regulation (see e.g. Lockhart and Rea, 2019 
Lockhart, 2015; Taherzadeh and Howley, 2018). Here our aim is not to offer a detailed 
account of biodiversity offsetting policy in England (for this see Apostolopoulou and 
Adams, 2019) but to shed light on the geographies of capitalism that are implicated in the 
emergence, legitimization, questioning and adoption of biodiversity offsetting in 
particular places.  
In line with the above approach, we adopt an in-depth case study approach and an 
understanding of neoliberal conservation (Apostolopoulou et al., 2014; Apostolopoulou 
and Adams, 2015; Büscher et al., 2014), and particularly biodiversity offsetting, as 
inextricably intertwined with the neoliberalization of space and place (Smith, 2010). Such 
an understanding necessitates the exploration of factors outside nature conservation itself 
that shape what conservation is and how it is practiced under the capitalist mode of 
production in different times and places. To achieve the latter we pay attention to the 
‘context of context’, the patterned and patterning macrospatial landscapes within which 
programmes of neoliberalization are articulated and the conditions of production of such 
landscapes (Brenner et al., 2010).  We thus turn our theoretical and empirical attention to 
the regional geographies that led to the formation of the Thames Gateway project, and the 
way they intersected with the fate of the Lodge Hill housing development by, inter alia, 
exploring the interrelationships between changing transport and urban geographies, and 
framings of nature and its conservation in the UK. By building on recent calls about the 
need for a political ecology of urbanization (Angelo and Wachsmuth, 2015), and recent 
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analyses of offsetting as the product of an urban policy, particularly in highly urbanized 
countries like the UK (Apostolopoulou, in press; Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2019), we 
see offsetting’s increasing popularity across the globe (Bennett et al., 2017; Bull and 
Strange, 2018) as tightly interwoven with competition for land and space in the era 
following the 2008 financial crash. Even though the interrelationship between offsetting 
and neoliberal urbanization that has so far escaped analytical attention (for an exception 
see Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2019), we see a convergence between offsetting and 
planetary urbanization (Lefebvre, 1970; Brenner and Schmid, 2015; Brenner, 2013) that 
fuels the further deregulation and market-friendly reregulation of environmental and 
planning legislation. Urbanization patterns have been historically interrelated with 
changes in transport geographies shaping the production of nature and place (Lefebvre, 
1991, 1970). New and extended transportation links reflect the need for constant 
reductions in the cost and time of movements in the capitalist mode of production 
(Harvey, 2006) and are a key manifestation of planetary urbanization (see e.g. Nüssli and 
Schmid, 2016). 
While recognizing the important contribution of the existing literature on 
theorizing neoliberal natures and conservation, we argue that adopting a geographical 
perspective and a case study approach can shed light on crucial factors that have been 
largely sidelined in critical conservation and political ecology studies, at least so far. 
Most importantly, such an approach would allow us to ‘track’ neoliberal conservation 
policies (Dempsey and Robertson, 2012) such as offsetting, and explore where they hit 
the ground, how they perform after they are released ‘in the wild’ (Peck et al., 2012, p. 
278), and how and by whom they are contested. Thereby, shedding light on the why, 
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where and when neoliberal policies succeed or fail to fulfill their promises 
(Apostolopoulou, in press; Lockhart and Rea, 2019).  
In what follows, we situate Lodge Hill in the historical and economic geographies 
that have shaped, and are still shaping, the socionatures of the wider area and excavate 
the way these have changed in the post-2008 era. Our analysis draws on empirical data 
collected through fieldwork from 2012 to 2016. These include: (i) 95 interviews with 
conservation NGOs, local groups, local and national administration, developers, 
consultants, and conservation brokers, involved in biodiversity offsetting in England. 19 
of these interviews were with people that were also involved in the Lodge Hill housing 
development, including representatives of NGOs, state agencies, private consultants, and 
local residents; (ii) documents related to the Lodge Hill development (Table 1) and the 
Thames Gateway regeneration project, and (iv) a visit to the site in 20153 (Figure 1).  
 
Lodge Hill in context: Megacities, the Thames Gateway and a military camp in the 
Hoo peninsula 
Lodge Hill sits next to the village of Chattenden on the Hoo Peninsula in Medway. The 
Medway conurbation (population c. 275,000) is one of the largest urban areas in South 
East England, located about 30 miles east of London. The site itself is 283.28 ha (2.83 
km2) and has been used for various military activities since 1873, most recently by the 
Royal School of Military Engineering as training grounds. It had been gradually 
decommissioned since the late 1980s. After the privatisation of military engineering 
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training services, it was deemed superfluous by Holdfast, the consortium that took over 
the training of military engineers in 2008.  
As mentioned above, the Thames Gateway project is essential in understanding 
the Lodge Hill housing development. The regeneration of the Thames Gateway has 
preoccupied governments, local councils and developers since the 1970s. After a series of 
closures, the docklands in East London went from c. 30,000 employees in the 1930s to 
just 3,000 in 1981. Unemployment in some areas of North Kent, such as Medway, was as 
high as 25% in the 1980s following the dockyards’ closure in 1984 and concurrent 
deindustrialisation. Adding to the above was the environmental blight left over by 
decades of industrial growth and subsequent dereliction.  
A key moment in the creation of the Thames Gateway was the announcement of 
the ‘East Thames Corridor’ as the regeneration vehicle for East London, South Essex and 
North Kent in 1991. 1991 was also the year when the construction of the Channel Tunnel 
was approved. In 1993, it was agreed that both the route and its high-speed trains would 
pass through North Kent and Medway, a few minutes’ drive from Lodge Hill4. In 1994, 
the Regional Planning Guidance for South East England was announced (Department of 
Environment, 1994), and the East Thames Corridor was officially in statute as ‘the main 
opportunity for growth’ and an ‘area of major development capacity’. In 1995, the 
Thames Gateway Planning Framework (Department of the Environment, 1995) contained 
the first statutory mention of the Lodge Hill development next to Chattenden village. 
According to the Framework ‘the release of land from the Defense estate’ in Lodge Hill 
could create the ‘scope for expanding the community into a new village’ (Department of 
the Environment, 1995: 60).  
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Despite the above aspirations, the Thames Gateway was not a compelling case at 
that period mainly due to economic slowdown and record low house prices (Turok, 2009; 
Supplementary Material Item 1). This changed in 2003, when New Labour launched its 
plans for the area. New Labour’s Sustainable Communities action plan (OPDM, 2003), 
designated the Thames Gateway as the biggest of the four national Growth Areas, 
inaugurating what was some years later named the largest regeneration project in Europe.  
New transport geographies have been gradually intertwined with new urbanisation 
patterns in the South East with the Thames Gateway being one of the major foci. As John 
et al. (2005) put it house building has been ‘the raison d’être’ of the Thames Gateway. 
This was further supported by the 2006 decision to hold the Olympic Games of 2012 in 
the East London part of the Gateway which led to a significant increase in housing 
projections (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009) and further investment in the area 
(Supplementary Material Item 4). Lodge Hill sat squarely within this housing growth 
drive and it was envisaged that it would become an ideal sleeping/commuting town, 
covering the majority of the increasing population and housing needs of the wider area, 
satisfying some the housing needs of London. Indeed, in 2011, around 20% of Medway 
residents worked in London, and as interviewees involved in the Lodge Hill development 
argued, the new proposal for the creation of 5,000 more houses was mostly intended for 




From nature translocation to biodiversity offsetting: The evolving frames of nature 
in UK conservation 
Since the mid-1980s, the advantages of relocating nature across space and time through 
habitat creation had already been identified by the extractive and civil engineering 
industries (Bullock et al., 1996). The liberty of developers to implement habitat 
translocation and creation schemes in the absence of proper regulations, evidence and 
monitoring (Worthington and Helliwell, 1987), forced state authorities to develop 
research projects to ascertain whether such schemes can achieve conservation aims 
(Bullock et al., 1996; Parker, 1995). The results showed that while such practices had 
potential in some cases, they were largely incompatible with the goals of nature 
conservation and No Net Loss, especially for valuable sites and species: “Habitat creation 
should never be put forward as a substitute for the conservation of seminatural habitat. 
There are too many examples of development proposals which promote such programmes 
as a full “mitigation” for the loss of existing seminatural habitat […] However, the 
evidence is clear that a complete replacement will very rarely be achieved” (Parker, 1995: 
1, original emphasis). 
Regarding the Thames Gateway project in particular, habitat creation as a way to 
compensate for habitat loss were considered by state and quasi-state agencies (e.g. 
English Nature) as inappropriate solutions for mitigating development impacts on 
biodiversity: “Nature conservation bodies […] do not view habitat creation as a 
replacement for the loss of wildlife [areas]. It would be impossible to predict […] how 
wildlife populations would react if areas of wildlife interest were lost and nationally 
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replaced by other sites offering conservation potential (Llewellyn and Tym, 1993: 28)”. 
The debate around the translocation of species, as far back as 2003, saw conservation 
bodies and the government’s advisers express deep concern for the push of the 
construction industry towards the reframing of non-human nature as movable, 
exchangeable and essentially reproducible (JNCC, 2003).  
However, the above approach has shifted significantly during the last decade. As 
many interviewees pointed out and as public documents further confirm, in 2007, when 
discussions started about the Lodge Hill housing development, biodiversity offsetting was 
gaining increasing popularity both internationally and in the UK. The decision to explore 
its implementation in the UK was officially announced in 2011. At that time, the 
Government published the Securing the Value of Nature White Paper (HM Government, 
2011) announcing a new voluntary approach to offsetting and a pilot scheme in six areas. 
In 2013, a Green Paper was published, outlining specific offset metrics for measuring 
biodiversity loss in terms of biodiversity ‘units’, ‘easily and quickly’, based on 
distinctiveness, habitat condition and habitat extent (Defra, 2013). In key documents that 
introduced offsetting in the UK planning system, habitat creation was considered not only 
feasible but also capable to ensure a No Net Loss of biodiversity while enabling ‘buying’ 
biodiversity ‘off the shelf’ (Defra, 2013).  
It is worth noticing that the changing frames of nature in UK conservation have 
been also expressed in the Sustainable Communities action plan (OPDM, 2003) which 
marked a new sustainability discourse (Raco, 2005) including, inter alia, plans to turn the 
Thames Gateway into an ‘ecoregion’. The Gateway was seen at that time as ‘an exciting 
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opportunity’ to integrate economic growth with environmental enhancement and promote 
an understanding of the landscape as a “functional green infrastructure” which can create 
a positive sense of place, provide environmental protection and enhance the local 
inhabitants quality of life (OPDM, 2004: 3). Interestingly, the concept of ‘green 
infrastructure’ saw widespread use in the UK first time in the context of the Gateway and 
was a key part of the Gateway’s sustainability paradigm (Raco, 2005) according to which 
nature becomes part of sustainability’s “triple bottom line”, a word-loan from economics 
to signify the “win-win-win” reconciliation between people, planet and profit 
(Allmendinger and Haughton, 2013: 95). Green infrastructure is largely based on a 
neoliberal utilitarian conceptualisation of nature  and aims to mark a ‘new environmental 
aesthetic’ (CABE, 2006). This conceptualisation of nature became clearer in the White 
Paper (HM Government, 2011), and, importantly, in the biodiversity offsetting Green 
Paper (Defra, 2013) where the links between nature-as-infrastructure and as a ‘movable 
amenity’, the key framing behind offsetting, became obvious.  
 
The first phase (2007-2013): The win-win discourse of biodiversity offsetting  
Even though Lodge Hill has been included in all regional planning strategies and plans 
since the 1995 Thames Gateway Development Plan, and was perceived as a strategic 
development that could address Medway’s housing needs, it was not until September 
2007 that the development started getting off the ground. The Ministry of Defence 
contracted Land Securities Group plc., a member of the FTSE 100 index and one of the 
biggest property developers in Britain. The proposal included 5,000 houses, a retail 
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centre, and related amenities, a promise for thousands of new jobs as well as a new 
‘sustainable’ community. As the website of the project mentioned, the development 
would lead to ‘a new sustainable community, capitalising on its exceptional setting, a 
distinctive place that connects to the surrounding rich countryside, with a land use pattern 
that minimizes the need to travel […] an exemplar for the Thames Gateway in the way 
that it minimises its impact on the environment and provides for an excellent quality of 
life for its residents’.  
The timing was important: house prices in England were at their peak and house 
building at a 20-year high (Fig. 1 and Supplementary Material Items 1 and 2), creating 
hopes for a profitable investment. However, the application was met from the beginning 
with opposition from a highly diverse group of people and organizations, including local 
community groups, conservation organizations and rival developers.  
Interviewees from the local community criticized the governmental emphasis on 
large-scale housing projects and openly questioned its social benefits, a criticism that was 
significantly fueled by the chronic state disinterest for the wider area:  
“We’ve got a hospital that doesn’t serve the needs of Medway, and they are 
going to build 5,000 more houses in Lodge Hill in addition to the 7,000 houses 
that have already got permission to be built in the area. How exactly they will 
cover the needs of all these people?” (Interview with a local campaigner) 
Along with concerns on the scope of the housing development and the interests it would 
serve, local people were also highly critical of its environmental impacts:  
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“We kept saying no, we know there’s nightingales there and if you go for 5,000 
you’re going to do material damage to the nightingale population. But they 
weren’t willing to reconsider this. They were putting all their eggs in one basket 
for this development”. (Interview with local campaigner) 
 
Figure 1. Average house prices in England. Source: Source: Office for National Statistics. 
From 2008 until 2011, Land Securities and Medway Council run several 
presentations, and hearing sessions, involving a host of interested parties. A series of 
nightingale habitat technical meetings were also held with representatives of conservation 
agencies and NGOs, consultants, the Environment Bank5, Medway Council, and others. 
Attendees of consultation workshops mentioned the area as one of the ‘top five sites in 
Kent for nightingales’ and argued that a ‘buffer zone should be introduced’ to ‘protect the 
species’ (Trimedia, 2009: 17).  
At the beginning of the consultations off-site mitigation for the loss of nightingale 
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possible’ or at ‘worst case’ within the Hoo Peninsula6. However, in 2012, data from the 
latest British Trust of Ornithology (BTO) national nightingale survey indicated that the 
Lodge Hill population was possibly exceeding the 1% of the national population (c. 1. 
3%) with around 60% of site population within or right on the edge of the proposed 
development area (Figures 3 and 4). According to the new data the impacts of the 
development would be much greater than initially thought and compensation would also 
have to be provided off-site. Indeed, Natural England in July 2012, argued that due “to 
the high proportion of nightingales within the proposed development area and their 
distribution […] if the development was to go ahead, reduction of the impact on the 
nightingale population would rely on compensatory habitat creation or management 
outside the development site”7 (our emphasis).  
The new data about the nightingale population along with the wider national 
policy context that was favorable towards the implementation of biodiversity offsetting 
(Apostolopoulou et al., 2014; Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2019), gradually led to the 
adoption of the offsetting option. In 2012, the Medway Council submitted its draft Core 
Strategy for examination by the Planning Inspectorate, designating Lodge Hill as a 
‘strategic allocation site’, meaning that it looked to cover its future housing needs mainly 
from this development. In the strategy, it was stated that mitigation for the nightingale 
population was to be done off-site and mainly through offsetting. For supporters of the 
Lodge Hill housing development, offsetting was seen as an opportunity to pass a planning 
application that was met for years with resistance both for its social and ecological 
impacts8. The Lodge Hill development was also perceived by offsetting’s supporters, 
including conservation brokers like the Environment Bank and sections of the 
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government, as an ideal case for proving offsetting’s win-win potential. On the contrary, 
activists argued that Lodge Hill was used from the beginning in a rather opportunistic 
way by the Government: 
“They were using Lodge Hill as an unannounced pilot – if the case was successful 
it would offer great publicity to offsetting and its potential to enable and green-
wash large-scale housing developments; but since it was not an official pilot they 
could also say that this was not an ‘official’ testing of offsetting if it failed”. 
(Member of a local conservation NGO). 
The Medway Council commissioned the Environment Bank, and in December 
2012, the final report on biodiversity offsetting was published (Environment Bank, 2012). 
The report concluded that offsetting could ensure No Net Loss of biodiversity and was 
technically feasible ‘although there are uncertainties in calculating how much is 
necessary’ (ibid, 13). Following the report’s publication offsetting was promoted by its 
supporters as a novel and realistic policy that had the potential to enable a development 
project of major economic importance to proceed while protecting the nightingales by 
addressing the inadequacies of the English planning system. The pro-offsetting rhetoric 
proved quite powerful at the beginning and created expectations even to local residents 
who were opposing the development: 
“There’s a historical mistrust by local people in mitigation and compensation for 
housebuilding. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence, not just in Medway but also 
in neighbouring Maidstone and Gravesham and other areas where communities 
are fighting developments for protecting wildlife, that they promise mitigation but 
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they don’t do it. When biodiversity offsetting first came in, we were sceptical but 
then we decided to support the idea because we thought that rather than that 
absurdity we had before of promises made and not delivered, this would be much 
more structured, the habitats would be looked at for their condition and monitored 
based on objective criteria, and there would be a signed up, legally binding 
agreement”.  
However, a report from BTO was published in 2012 (Hewson and Fuller, 2012) 
arguing that even though habitat creation ‘is theoretically feasible’ (p. 12), they clearly 
did not endorse it in their conclusions (p. 18). The BTO report was submitted as evidence 
against the implementation of offsetting and was admitted as such by the Planning 
Inspector who was in charge of approving the Medway Council’s Core Strategy9. The 
lack of evidence that habitat creation would actually work played a key role in changing 
the position of local people: 
“Crikey, it didn’t last long, our hopes. Fortunately, we were disillusioned fairly 
early. The first thing they did [the Environment Bank] was a scoping study, and 
after that their first statement was that they could find no evidence that habitat 
creation for nightingales hasn’t worked. We were stunned and we told them that 
this doesn’t ring true. We have extensively discussed with NGOs and experts and 
we had read the BTO report and we knew that everyone was saying that they 
knew no examples where creating habitat in areas where there were no occupied 
nightingales worked”. (Local campaigner) 
And: 
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“….because there are no nightingales there [in the proposed offset site] they said 
they were going to use tapes to lure them in. The BTO explained this is an 
ecological trap; you can bring in females to join a tape of a singing male into a 
habitat that’s got no food. It just struck us and shocked us that’s how desperate 
they were that they would use tape luring to bring them in”. (Local campaigner) 
The attempt of offsetting’s supporters to force a consensus that did not exist along 
with continuous inconsistencies and conflicting information gradually exposed the role 
that offsetting was expected to play: 
“At first they said the offset site should not be far from Lodge Hill. But when we 
asked more information it came up that the sites they had in mind weren’t 
suitable, that the owners didn’t want to sell, that they were floodplains or the 
farmers wanted to build solar panels on them […]”. (Local campaigner) 
We should point out here that the complexities of biodiversity offsetting for 
nightingales noted by several interviewees are related to the particularities of the species 
and its habitat, which were unveiled by the release of the BTO report (Hewson and 
Fuller, 2012).  Nightingales winter in sub-Saharan Africa, and arrive in England for a 
spell between circa April-August, and go back to Africa. Every time they arrive back to 
England they go to the same place; if it is the first time they take the trip, it is thought that 
the presence of other nightingales (‘conspecifics’) attracts them to a particular place. 
Thus, the BTO report (Hewson and Fuller, 2012) notes:  
“We are unaware of any detailed published account that explicitly describes 
the establishment of a nightingale population in relation to habitat creation and 
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vegetation development on a formerly unoccupied site. Indeed, we are 
unaware of any instance where habitat creation for nightingales has been 
attempted on any large scale”. (p. 18) 
And: 
“[I]t is possible that Nightingale settlement patterns within available habitat 
are influenced by ‘conspecific attraction’ i.e. the presence of other 
Nightingales already occupying the [new] area … [T]he result of social 
processes operating may be that initial stages of colonisation are more difficult 
and proceed more slowly, until a small population becomes resident”. (p. 13) 
It is important to emphasize that nightingales have declined by 90% in the last 50 
years and they appear on the UK’s Red List of birds of high conservation concern10. 
 
The second phase (2013-2017): The new SSSI notification and the abandonment of 
the development plans  
The new data about the nightingale population forced Natural England to consider 
notifying the site as a Site of Special Scientific Interest11 (SSSI). Initially, in October 
2012, Natural England decided not to do so12, ‘due to insufficient confidence in the 
national population [of nightingales] estimate’. However, in 2013 the BTO official 
estimates were released, indicating that 84 pairs of nightingales were found on the 
development site representing 1.3% of the national population13. 1% is a threshold that 
allows for the declaration of SSSI status and, thus, in November 2013, Natural England’s 
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Executive Board confirmed that the existing Chattenden Woods SSSI would be extended 
to include most of the land within the Lodge Hill site (Figure 4). The decision was also 
based on the presence of ancient woodland and neutral grassland. The new SSSI is 
around 351 hectares, of which 236 hectares were part of the Lodge Hill development. In 
its closing statement to the Planning Inspector, Natural England, despite raising concerns 
regarding the nightingale population if the development were to proceed14, kept a neutral 
position on what should be done. As interviewees from Defra pointed out, since the 
planning system does not prohibit building on an SSSI, the SSSI notification did not 
exclude offsetting from consideration. 
In 2013, citing the nightingales and National Planning Policy Framework’s 
presumption for sustainable development, the Planning Inspector concluded that ‘the only 
reasonable course of action’ is for the Council to withdraw its Core Strategy and prepare 
a new Local Plan, effectively stopping the development. In November 2013, the Council 
withdrew the Strategy. The BTO findings and the SSSI notification were critical also in 
the sense that they solidified the mounting opposition to the housing development. It is 
important to emphasise here the very diverse alliance of organisations that grouped 
together (Table 3): from local conservation groups and businesses, to large NGOs and 
national-scale FTSE 500 developers, like rival developers Barratt Strategic and the 
Church Commissioners for England who had competing development interests in the 
area:  
“…we’ve got lots of developers who have lawyers and if they don’t want Lodge 
Hill to happen they might them bring in, because they’ve got their vested interests 
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in other land in Medway, sites that they want to build on and they would lose out 
if Medway Council got their 5,000 at Lodge Hill.” 
And:  
“There was another consultant who wrote several emails destroying the arguments 
of [proponents of offsetting] using a detailed analysis of even hard stuff on 
metrics etc. […] He works as a consultant for developers who have alternative 
sites to build houses on but he was on our side for stopping Lodge Hill so we were 
grateful for his inputs”. (Local campaigner) 
The opposition by competing businesses along with the opposition from some of 
the biggest national NGOs in England was crucial, as they spent human and financial 
resources in submitting evidence against the development to the Planning Inspector. 
Locally, Lodge Hill was opposed by the majority of Medway residents and all parish 
councils, as evidenced by the fact that the project became a major political issue in the 
2014 by-elections15. As interviewees from the local community argued, the 
Conservatives, worried about local backlash, performed a volte-face, with their candidate 
opposing the decision of the Conservative-led council, as did Ukip and the Greens16: 
“Now the conservatives oppose something that the Conservative council voted 
for. It’s odd. They have done this because they were getting very anti-Lodge 
Hill vibes. […]. Lodge Hill is becoming quite a political issue”. 
Land Securities, on their side, in February 2014, submitted an updated planning 
application to Medway Council to address the environmental impacts in light of the new 
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SSSI designation. The new approach was again met with criticism by local campaigners. 
As one of the participants in the consultation process pointed out: 
“The planning application was re-submitted in February and we saw that they 
ignored work done during examination in public. They used their own metric and their 
own calculation and they came out with a figure of 264 hectares which was much lower 
than the previously agreed figure”. 
The updated application also adopted a new terminology: instead of ‘offsetting’ 
now the term ‘compensation’ was used. However, the core logic of offsetting had not 
been abandoned and the developers were now arguing that they would achieve a Net 
Gain of biodiversity:  
 “We will do better than No Net Loss. So we are pretty certain that nightingales 
will persist as a small population at Lodge Hill and at the immediate adjacent off-
site mitigation area which means that if we are compensating for the loss of the 
1% of the population, which is what the site supports, then we are actually 
overcompensating because a proportion of that population will still carry on 
breeding at the site”14. 
The new report proposed on-site habitat creation for the less conflictual species 
(e.g. great crested newts), a new off-site mitigation area (approx. 86 ha) and a nightingale 
compensation site (approx. 264 ha) within land owned by the Ministry of Defence in 
Shoeburyness/Foulness in Essex. Even though the terminology was different, from 
“offsetting” to ”No Net Loss” compensation, the logic of offsetting, including the use of 
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metrics and multipliers, as well as the metaphor of movable nature, were evident in the 
new proposals.  
Importantly, the proposed nightingale habitat compensation area was across the 
Thames, had no public access, and if implemented, would severely disrupt the 
connections of local residents with the area. As a local resident who participated in the 
Public Enquiry argued:  
“You can’t replace the beauty of this place in my humble opinion. We are 
losing something valuable. You know you can go to the first roundabout and 
hear about five nightingales competing against each other and I’ve brought up 
elderly relatives who were disabled and I got them up in the car and just 
opened the window and they heard their first nightingale, it’s just brilliant. The 
Medway Council has never advertised it as a beautiful place, rich with Duke 
of Burgundy and all the rest”.  
 It is important to emphasize here that despite the significance of Lodge Hill for 
local people, the impacts of the loss of nightingale habitat for the local community have 
been characteristically underestimated by all involved parties, ranging from 
conservationists who argued that the issue is the compensation for the loss of biodiversity 
and not the social impacts, to the brokers and the developer’s consultants who did not 
hesitate to characterize the role of local people as negative for the nightingales. 
The fact that the offsetting proposal had been gradually rebranded as ‘nightingale 
compensation land’ led many key actors to perplexity. Representatives of Natural 
England argued that Lodge Hill was not an ‘offsetting’ case anymore since the Defra 
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metrics had been abandoned. Opponents of the development, and particularly 
conservationists, interpreted this as a communication strategy from the Government and 
public environmental administration to distance themselves from a case that was 
becoming highly controversial. Despite the strong reaction from conservationists and 
local residents to the new proposals, the Medway Council’s Planning Committee decided, 
by applying the same principles of the National Planning Policy Framework that the 
Planning Inspector used to dismiss the Plan, that ‘development needs outweighed the 
impact to the SSSI’17. The Council, after increasing housing targets in June 2014 at 1,000 
dwellings per year, unanimously approved the updated application in September 2014, 
subject to its referral to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. 
However, nightingales proved their worth as ‘feathered obstacles’ for a second time: the 
decision was ‘called-in’ in February 2015. This meant that ministers, following a public 
inquiry would have to judge whether the national significance of the development could 
override wildlife concerns. 
In September 2015, Land Securities, citing the increased costs  incurred by the 
environmental requirements of the project, pulled out of its contract with the Ministry of 
Defence18. The public inquiry that was scheduled did not go ahead and, in September 
2017, the Defence Infrastructure Organisation and the Homes and Communities Agency 
also withdrew their planning application but stated that they intend to submit revised 
proposals19. In spring 2018, Medway Council submitted a new Local Plan that included 
the Lodge Hill development with a reduced number of houses (2,000), leading again to 
petitions from NGOs, including the RSPB and the Wildlife Trusts, and local opposition. 
At the time of writing, the latest news is that in December 2018, Homes England, the 
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state agency responsible for affordable housing that replaced the Homes and 
Communities Agency and current owner of the land, revealed a much smaller 
development plan (500 homes), taking place outside the SSSI boundaries20, which was 
met with relief (and some apprehension) by campaigners. In essence, this latest 
development put an end to ideas of a megaproject-type house building in Lodge Hill.  
 
The rise and fall of biodiversity offsetting in Lodge Hill: the where, when and by 
whom 
Our analysis of biodiversity offsetting in Lodge Hill contributes to the understanding of 
both the ‘context of context’ (Brenner et al., 2010) and the historically-geographically 
specific factors and socioeconomic, ecological, and political conditions that initially led 
to offsetting’s selection as the appropriate policy to resolve a classical conflict between 
environmental protection and urban development (Apostolopoulou and Pantis, 2010), and 
that have ultimately determined its failure in fulfilling its promises. This analysis can 
shed light on the drivers that are behind the localisation of neoliberal conservation and 
urbanization policies and their success or failure on the ground and, therefore, has 
important implications for future critical geographical research and praxis.  
 In particular, it contributes to theorizing the link between neoliberal natures 
(Heynen et al., 2007) and the changing economic geographies of capitalism. 
Transformations in economic and transport geographies in the 1990s have been largely 
fuelled by the ‘infrastructural’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ visions that shaped the Thames 
Gateway regeneration project and economic development in South East England more 
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broadly (Sparke, 2000). The importance of the High Speed 1 rail line that connects 
London, Kent and the rest of Europe played a central role in shaping the wider dynamics 
in the area. For British capitalism, the Thames Gateway (along with the high speed rail 
line) reflected an ‘area of opportunity; at the threshold of Europe’s largest city and of the 
expanding continental marketplace’ (Department of the Environment, 1995: 2). Perpetual 
reductions in the cost and time of movement and the drive for eliminating distance and 
spatial barriers through advances in technology and transport infrastructure (see also 
Marx, 1857 on the “annihilation of space with time”; Harvey, 1989) could potentially 
provide the engine for the circulation of capital and materials between the emerging 
mega-region of London and the expanding European market. These expectations were 
clearly expressed by the Department of Environment: ‘as the European Single Market is 
increasing the relative importance of trade with Europe, the prospect of the Channel 
Tunnel opening in 1993 or 1994  … will revolutionise the accessibility of the East 
Thames Corridor’ (Llewellyn and Tym, 1993: 2). Changes in economic and transport 
geographies have, in turn, bound with transformations in urban geographies and played a 
central role in the production of large-scale housing ‘visions’ (Sparke, 2000) in Medway 
and the Hoo Peninsula. The territorialisation of the Thames Gateway was thus strongly 
moulded by the changing geographies of the South East (Allmendinger and Haughton, 
2009).  
Thus, the consolidation of London not just as an expanding city but also as an 
aggregating and expanding web of relations has been relying on ‘sacrificial countrysides’ 
(see also Arboleda, 2016) like Lodge Hill, something particularly obvious during the last 
decade. Lodge Hill should be seen as part of a dense web of relations between London as 
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an evolving megacity, adjacent peripheral cities, towns and villages, and (international) 
transportation corridors. As the 1970s economic crisis opened up the city as a laboratory 
for neoliberal experiments (Harvey, 2005), the same happened, and is still happening, 
with the 2008 crisis not only for the city but also for the urbanising countryside, the city-
region and ‘urban galaxies’ (Soja and Kanai, 2006), like London and its extended 
regional urbanisation.  
The dialectical relationship between dominant narratives of nature and changing 
transport and urban geographies has been expressed in the way that the Thames Gateway 
has been linked to the reframing of nature as a ‘movable amenity’ in the early 2010s. 
Moreover, and relatedly, it has been evident in the important policy shift, from the 1990s 
until today, from the position that habitat creation should rarely be considered as an 
appropriate solution for replacing the loss of wildlife areas, to the current endorsement of 
offsetting as the best way to ensure not only a No Net Loss but also a Net Gain of 
biodiversity, not only in the UK but worldwide (Bull and Strange, 2018). Offsetting 
brings about a reframing of non-human nature as a movable amenity that can be relocated 
where development interests dictate, implying that due to scientific advancements, 
primarily in natural capital accounting and restoration ecology, non-human nature should 
not be a barrier to economic growth since it can be destroyed and replicated without any 
loss occurring. The notion of equivalent and exchangeable natures is intertwined with the 
new territorialities that innovations in transportation and urbanization have engendered, 
showing the spatial aspect of biodiversity offsetting.  
Indeed, the emergence of offsetting in the UK can be linked to the 
entrepreneurialisation and urbanisation of rural areas and has been related to the 
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imperative to deregulate/re-regulate environmental and planning legislation to facilitate 
urbanization not only in post-financial crisis England (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2015, 
2017; Apostolopoulou et al., 2014), but in many places across the globe (Bennett et al., 
2017). Therefore, in considering so-called “innovative” market-based instruments, such 
as biodiversity offsetting, we think that a clear shift is needed in the neoliberal 
conservation literature from exploring their role in promoting “accumulation by 
conservation” (Büscher and Fletcher, 2015) to substantiating the way they are used in 
support of capital accumulation through facilitating real estate development, especially in 
the context of a prolonged economic crisis and the prevalence of austerity politics (see 
also Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2019; Apostolopoulou et al., 2018).  
Importantly, offsetting should be seen as part of urbanisation’s ‘creative 
destruction’ (Brenner and Schmid, 2015; Lefebvre, 1970) that dispossesses the public of 
any right to the production of space and nature (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2019). 
Offsetting’s social impacts (see Re:Common, 2018; Seagle, 2012) are shown well in the 
Lodge Hill case: the existing nature did not fit well into the new ‘green’ vision for the 
wider area. Due to the gradual transformation from military training grounds to an 
‘empty’ landscape, Lodge Hill has become a peculiar place. It could be called a ‘marginal 
site of spontaneous nature’ (Gandy, 2013: 1312) or an unintentional landscape (Gandy, 
2016) where nature has taken over a unique built environment. This ‘undisciplined’ 
environment, regardless of its value for the local community, had to be transformed into a 
site for capital accumulation whereas compensation for this loss could be placed in a 
different area were public access would be restricted.  
 30 
Two further observations are important here. Firstly, the Lodge Hill case points to 
the pioneering role of large-scale developments and extractive industries in the 
emergence of the framing and practice of ‘movable natures’ in English conservation that 
has been further consolidated through the emergence of biodiversity offsetting. The latter 
has coincided with the ascension of the conservation consultancy industry into a 
multibillion industry with FTSE-included companies that allowed private consulting 
firms to have a strong impact in the formulation and adoption of environmental policies. 
Thus, along with the documented role of big conservation NGOs in shaping the 
geography of UK conservation (Adams et al., 2014), there is also an ‘archipelago of 
consultants, marketing experts, public relations people, lawyers, [and] creative 
accountants’ (Hall et al., 2013: 16) that strongly supported the promotion of market-based 
environmentalism. Even though the latter has been exemplified in the Lodge Hill case 
through the decisive role of the Environment Bank and the various consultants that were 
involved from both sides of the nightingale issue, it should not lead us to underestimate 
the role of the government as evidenced in the Green Paper’s argumentation for 
introducing the policy in the English planning system (Defra, 2013). 
Secondly, transport geographies, despite the limited attention that have received 
so far, often intertwine with neoliberal conservation playing a profound role in shaping 
dominant framings of non-human nature and its conservation. Indicative examples 
include the biodiversity offsetting project of the Network Rail’s Thameslink Programme 
in partnership with London Wildlife Trust and Lambeth Council that aims to restore the 
Great North Wood, which once grew across much of South London21. Another example 
is the Wallasea Island project, an RSPB-Crossrail partnership aiming to combine the 
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largest construction project in Europe with the continent’s biggest coastal habitat creation 
scheme, with the goal to save ‘both projects significant sums of money’ (Comeford et al., 
2010: 39). Returning to the Thames Gateway but looking at a different case, the 
construction of the London Gateway deep-water port and Logistics Park in South Essex, 
entailed the biggest translocation of animals and habitats in the UK. According to media 
reports, ‘24,000 adders, grass snakes, common lizards and slow worms’22 were 
translocated 140 miles away in a project organized by the Environment Bank. This 
reminds us that ports, as major transport and logistics hubs, played a crucial role in the 
grounding of another reframing of nature related to the implementation of the EU 
Habitat’s Directive (92/43/EEC) in the late 1990s/early 2000s: the move from an 
understanding of nature as static and in state of equilibrium, to an understanding of nature 
as non-equilibrium, non-static, with fluid boundaries and hybrid ontologies (Gibbs et al., 
2007).  
 
Understanding the success and failure of actually existing neoliberal conservation   
One key lesson that the Lodge Hill case offers is that the details of policies matter. 
Biodiversity offsetting is a policy largely based on a typical win-win rhetoric of success 
and on promises that previous conundrums will be solved through the introduction of a 
new, improved approach of delivering environmental compensation. This was 
particularly evident in the UK where supporters of the policy were mainly framing 
offsetting as a rational and pragmatic response to the previous failures of the planning 
system. However, offsetting policies are also known for their inability to address their 
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promises (Apostolopoulou, in press) and their success is highly contestable (Gibbons et 
al., 2018). In cases of high publicity and strong local opposition, like the Lodge Hill case, 
this discrepancy between rhetoric and reality did not remain unchallenged. The scrutiny 
that the policy has received has exposed several inconsistencies that its supporters were 
trying to conceal by orchestrating a consensus that was essentially non-existent. To add to 
that, the national importance of the nightingale’s population made Lodge Hill a symbolic 
battleground the outcome of which would indicate the future of wildlife in the UK under 
the new era of biodiversity offsetting. This urges to think that offsetting, particularly in 
countries like the UK with a strong conservation movement historically, has fewer 
chances to succeed in cases of major publicity and ecological impacts of wider societal 
interest, as in the case of an iconic species for British naturalism like the nightingale 
(Supplementary Material Item 3), and more chances either in small-scale projects or 
when the implicated species and habitats are considered more common (Apostolopoulou, 
in press) or less charismatic (Lorimer, 2007). 
Furthermore, while the well-documented charisma of nightingales played a 
significant role in the failure of biodiversity offsetting in Lodge Hill, as compared for 
example to great crested newts that are continuously ‘moved around’ in translocation 
schemes, the ecological and biological features of this particular species were also 
important. As a migratory animal, with very particular habitat requirements and complex 
behavioural ecology, the nightingale is not a straightforward target for offsetting. 
Importantly, the biology and ecology as well as the population status of the species were 
only revealed after laborious surveying by nightingale experts and statistical calculations 
by BTO. The latter shows that natural sciences, in this case ecology, even though they 
 33 
may often enable, through for example their role in the designation and legitimatization 
of reductionist offset metrics and valuation techniques, the march of neoliberal natures, 
they also have the potential to create significant barriers to the latter. 
Another significant lesson from the Lodge Hill case is that the controversy over 
the proposed development in Lodge Hill cannot, be reduced to a discussion focusing only 
on disagreements over offsetting metrics or even on the promises and pitfalls of 
neoliberal conservation policies such as biodiversity offsetting. It is rather a constellation 
of factors in all their historical and geographical variegation, including the UK housing 
crisis, the increasingly contested discourse of ‘hyper-regeneration23’, the London 2012 
summer Olympics, the Thames Gateway, the ecological, social and cultural importance 
of nightingales, as well as the chronic dissatisfaction of local inhabitants with the 
ecological and social impacts of neoliberal urbanization that the wider area was suffering 
due to its links to the Thames Gateway, along with an archipelago of often invisible 
actors, that have been (and still are) at play. It is also the above constellation of factors 
that can explain why Lodge Hill not only has not been the success story that the UK 
government was aiming for, but it became a case of a successfully ‘contested 
neoliberalism’ (Leitner et al., 2007), contributing at that time to the decreasing popularity 
of biodiversity offsetting in the UK (Lockhart, 2015).  
It is important to point out here that offsetting currently remains optional for 
developers in England. The policy has proven controversial and has been contested by 
many local communities, some national NGOs and activist organisations. However, 
despite the setback and the absence, at least so far, of a biodiversity credits market at a 
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national scale (Lockhart and Rea, 2019), biodiversity offsetting is being currently 
implemented in several localities and districts across the country (see e.g. District Level 
licencing for great crested newts24), often facilitating controversial urban development 
projects (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2019). Furthermore, the UK government is in the 
process of rolling out a new policy based on the key concept behind biodiversity 
offsetting, namely Net Gain. The latter has already been included in the updated National 
Planning Policy Framework released in February 2019, while a public consultation on the 
government’s Net Gain proposal run in late 2018. In July 2019 the government published 
its response, promising to make Net Gain mandatory in a forthcoming Environment Bill 
(see Defra 201925).   
The fact that non-market-dependent variants of biodiversity offsetting are being 
implemented across England and Net Gain is about to be mandated by Government law 
allows us to argue that its introduction into UK policy was not a failure. As the Lodge 
Hill case shows the introduction of offsetting into UK policy has not led so far to the 
creation of environmental markets in the model of the US but has been nonetheless 
clearly related to a governmental attempt to re-regulate, streamline and simplify 
environmental licencing for infrastructure, housing, and other types of development. 
Thus, despite setbacks exemplified by the Lodge Hill case, offsetting will be part of 
environmental policy in UK, while the question of market-creation remains open (see 
Defra 201926). 
Our understanding of the evolution of biodiversity offsetting in the Lodge Hill 
case as an outcome of the articulation of transport and urbanisation geographies with 
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neoliberal natures, offers some important insights into the kind of alliances that forged to 
oppose biodiversity offsetting and our theoretical and methodological choice of looking 
closely at the geographies shaping the Lodge Hill case allows us to do so. Viewing this 
conflict through urbanisation lenses, we can understand that rival developers, such as 
Barratt Strategic, McCulloch Homes, Taylor Wimpey, or The Church Commissioners for 
England, while instrumental in contesting biodiversity offsetting and the development in 
Lodge Hill, are competitors for housing planning licences – competitors for land to build 
on. This shows both that intra-capitalist competition within processes of extended 
urbanisation influences the dynamics of the neoliberalisation of nature and that 
biodiversity offsetting can have both positive and negative roles to play in relation to 
accumulation, something that has so far received almost no attention in the existing 
literature (for an exception see Apostolopoulou et al., 2018). 
The picture gets even more complicated if we delve deeper into the heterogeneous 
assemblage that resisted the housing development and the offsetting proposals. In 
particular, the Lodge Hill case allows us to understand not only the opportunistic way 
offsetting may be used to enable and legitimize controversial urban developments, but 
also that a crucial factor that may determine its success or failure is the variety of 
interests that may oppose it. In this case, it was a wide, and conflicting alliance of 
interests that strongly opposed governmental plans leading to offsetting’s failure to 
achieve its promise of smoothing conservation-development conflicts. This urges us to 
move beyond an uncritical embracement of opposition and consider the origins, scope, 
limits and potentials of particular alliances to understand how solidarities are constructed 
(see Featherstone, 2013). In the Lodge Hill case, the opposition ranged from opposition 
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to the housing development from competing development interests reflecting the interests 
of different sections of capital, opposition to offsetting from conservationists and 
opposition to both the development and offsetting from local residents on the basis of the 
ecological and social impacts and injustices. Interestingly, this included some big NGOs 
who while they were among the strongest opponents of the housing development and the 
use of offsetting in Lodge Hill27, they have otherwise been strong supporters of neoliberal 
conservation policies, including offsetting (see e.g. Comeford et al., 2010). This shows 
that we cannot always predict which organisations/actors/institutions will offer their 
support or not to neoliberal policies ‘in the wild’ by taking into consideration only their 
public position documents or national level stance, since contradictory or opportunistic 
positions are common.  
Even though the formation of this broad front played a key role in the failure of 
the governmental plans, it is our belief that such a broad alliance has profound limitations 
primarily because it cannot lead to any alternative and socially progressive alliance linked 
to wider issues of social and environmental justice. The latter would necessitate 
identifying the common interests and goals between a circumstantial agreement against 
this particular housing development and offsetting proposal. Such a political exercise is 
crucial not only for future alliances against new proposals for the economic exploitation 
of Lodge Hill or for implementing offsetting, but also for tracing similar and divergent 
trajectories in different places and forming possible alliances that move beyond the 
specificities of place-based opposition and have the potential to more effectively contest 
neoliberalism on the ground by demanding a radically different production of 
socionatures. This would require finding the common interests between those who 
 37 
contest the capitalist production of nature and space in different places without 
underestimating that uneven geographical development (Smith, 2010; Harvey, 2006) may 
necessitate different strategies, tactics and alliances for contesting capitalism in different 
places, regions and countries (see Gramsci, 1971).  
We have tried to offer a thick description of the Lodge Hill case while considering 
the economic and urban geographies and environmental politics that shaped its fate. We 
believe that this analysis can contribute in explaining what drives and determines the 
implementation of neoliberal conservation on the ground while exposing the fragility of 
the conditions necessary for the neoliberalization of nature, including so far largely 
ignored factors like intra-capitalist competition and the role of the publicity and charisma 
of a species for its exploitation and for resistance thereto. Our analysis, by offering a 
nuanced understanding of the dialectics of success and failure of particular policies as 
occurring in real time and space and not in a geographical vacuum as often implied in the 
literature is also important for building ‘an oppositional politics on the basis of situated 
knowledges’ enabling the formation of new political-economic alliances that transcend 
place (Katz, 2001: 1230). The latter can become possible by linking place-based 
opposition to broader processes that fuel such opposition creating the conditions for 
uniting spatially specific struggles to form a “more universal” politics (Featherstone, 
2005: 252; Harvey, 2000, 2012). Ultimately, the story of Lodge Hill and the way we 
chose to analyse it in this paper can show how the geographies of offsetting, and more 
broadly of neoliberal conservation policies, are linked to specific political questions of 
what alliances, in which spaces, can offer long-term radical alternatives to neoliberal 
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permission. 
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Cross/ St. Pancras trip (central London) is c. 40 minute trip, a commute time which is comparable 
to many places within the London metropolitan region. 
5 The Environment Bank Ltd. was set up in 2006 to “promote the concept of biodiversity 
offsetting in the UK and are now a leading ecological consultancy specialising in biodiversity 
accounting, metrics and offset brokerage” (https://www.environmentbank.com/about-us/). Its 
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